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The Fight for Bourgeois Law in Halifax, 
Nova Scotia, 1749-1753
JAMES MUIR*
In the new colony of Halifax, merchants and other members of the colonial 
bourgeois desired a legal order that would support their commercial needs, not 
impede their activities, and that included members of their class. In a series of 
legal disputes between 1749 and 1753 the bourgeois fought for their interests in 
front of and against the colony’s government. In each case, the merchants and 
their allies lost the specific legal dispute but secured changes in the legal regime 
that better met their expectations.
Dans la nouvelle colonie de Halifax, les marchands et d’autres membres de la 
bourgeoisie coloniale ont voulu avoir un ordre juridique qui irait dans le sens 
de leurs besoins commerciaux, sans entraver leurs activités, et qui inclurait des 
membres de leur classe. Dans une série de litiges survenus entre 1749 et 1753, 
les bourgeois ont lutté pour leurs intérêts devant le gouvernement de la colonie 
et contre celui-ci. Dans chaque cas, les marchands et leurs alliés ont perdu leur 
cause en justice, mais ils ont obtenu des changements dans le régime juridique qui 
répondaient mieux à leurs attentes.
IN EARLY SUMMER 1749, Colonel Edward Cornwallis led a convoy of 14 
ships and 2,576 people to Chebucto Harbor, the site of Nova Scotia’s new capital, 
Halifax. Although many in the original convoy left, those who stayed were joined 
by others from the American colonies as well as England and Europe. The 1752 
census found 4,248 people in the town and its suburbs.1 Halifax would not be just 
a military outpost against the French, but a fully functioning town and suburb, 
with farms nearby, a large number of artisans, and seafarers to take up fishing. The 
settlers also included several who sought their fortunes as merchants and traders.
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 The political and economic history of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
Halifax and Nova Scotia has been dominated by the story of Halifax’s merchants. 
Although ex-soldiers, ex-navy sailors, craftspeople, labourers, fishers, and farmers 
comprised the vast majority of Halifax’s population, and Acadians (up to 1755) 
and Mi’kmaq dominated colonial Nova Scotia’s population, the struggle between 
the bourgeois and the governing elite determined control of the colony. This battle 
simmered throughout the colony’s eighteenth-century history, and historians have 
focused on the fight over establishing the assembly in the late 1750s and responses 
to the American Revolution in the 1770s.2 The struggle between merchants and 
government is at the core of some of J. B. Brebner’s and Thomas Raddall’s most read 
works about Halifax and Nova Scotia published in the mid-twentieth century.3 In 
the decades since, the theme has been taken up by successive historians, including 
W. S. MacNutt, David Sutherland, and Patricia Rogers. In their Concise History 
of Business in Canada, Peter Baskerville and Graham D. Taylor go so far as to 
characterize Nova Scotia in the latter part of the eighteenth and throughout the 
nineteenth century as a “merchantocracy.”4 Even Julian Gwyn, who is sceptical of 
the merchant power thesis, has addressed merchants in some depth.5 Much of the 
story told so far has focused on the merchants’ political activity. This article is the 
first serious analysis of the merchants’ earliest legal struggles.
 Halifax’s colonial bourgeois6 were primarily merchants and traders who 
earned their sometimes quite substantial living from trading goods into, out of, 
2 See J. B. Brebner, The Neutral Yankees of Nova Scotia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1937; repr. 
Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1969), chap. 1-4; Barry Cahill, “The Treason of the Merchants: Dissent 
and Repression in Halifax in the Era of the American Revolution,” Acadiensis, vol. 26, no. 1 (Autumn 
1996), pp. 52-70.
3 For Brebner, see The Neutral Yankees of Nova Scotia. For Raddall, see both his history, Halifax, Warden of 
the North (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1948), and his novel, Roger Sudden (Toronto: McClelland & 
Stewart, 1944). For a discussion of Raddall and Brebner in creating Nova Scotia’s past, see Ian McKay and 
Robin Bates, In the Province of History: The Making of the Public Past in Twentieth-Century Nova Scotia 
(Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010), pp. 44-45, 221-224.
4 W. S. MacNutt, The Atlantic Provinces: The Emergence of Colonial Society, 1712-1857 (Toronto: 
McClelland & Stewart, 1965); David Sutherland, “Halifax Merchants and the Pursuit of Development, 
1783-1850,” Canadian Historical Review, vol. 59, no. 1 (1978), pp. 1-17, and “The Merchants of Halifax, 
1815-1850: A Commercial Class in Pursuit of Metropolitan Status” (doctoral dissertation, University of 
Toronto, 1975); Patricia Rogers, “Rebels’ Property: Smuggling and Imperial [Dis]loyalty in the Anglo-
American Atlantic,” Journal of Early American History, vol 2, no. 2 (2012), pp. 32-67, and “‘Unprincipled 
Men Who Are One Day British Subjects and the Next Citizens of the United States’: The Nova Scotian 
Merchant Community and Colonial Identity Formation, c. 1780-1820” (doctoral dissertation, Michigan 
State University, 2001); Graham D. Taylor and Peter A. Baskerville, A Concise History of Business in 
Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 109-114.
5 Julian Gwyn, Excessive Expectations: Maritime Commerce & the Economic Development of Nova Scotia, 
1740-1870 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1998), pp. 4-6 and throughout, as 
well as “Capitalists, Merchants and Manufacturers in Early Nova Scotia, 1769-1791: The Tangled Affairs 
of John Avery, James Creighton, John Albro, and Joseph Fairbanks” in Margaret Conrad, ed., Intimate 
Relations: Family and Community in Planter Nova Scotia, 1759-1800 (Fredericton: Acadiensis Press, 
1995), and “‘A Slave to Business all my Life.’ Joshua Mauger ca. 1712-1788, the Man and the Myth,” 
Journal of the Royal Nova Scotia Historical Society, vol. 7 (2004), pp. 38-62.
6 My use of the term bourgeois is influenced by Franco Moretti, The Bourgeois: Between History and 
Literature (New York and London: Verso Press, 2013), especially pp. 1-17. For a history of the trans-
Atlantic bourgeois of the eighteenth century, see David Hancock, Citizens of the World: London Merchants 
and the Integration of the British Atlantic Community, 1735-1785 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997). There is some affinity between at least people like Joshua Mauger, Thomas Saul, and Malachy 
3and about Halifax. Connected to commercial elites in other parts of the British 
Americas and in Britain, they were much wealthier than the majority of Halifax’s 
population. Consider two of the core characters in this article: Joshua Mauger 
arrived in Halifax in 1749, a 24-year-old from Jersey, most recently victualler 
to the navy at the captured Louisbourg. He kept his contract with the Navy in 
Halifax and in 1751 established the colony’s first distillery, protected by a tariff on 
any imported spirits except from Britain or the British West Indies. Over his first 
decade of Halifax, Mauger came to be one of the colony’s largest land and ship 
owners, with partial or full ownership of 27 vessels.7 Ephraim Cook, master of 
one of the ships in the original convoy and later a merchant, had personal property 
(including a slave) that sold for more than £3,700 at auction in 1755.8 By contrast, 
sailors in Halifax commanded salaries of only as much as £3 or £3 10s a month, 
labourers on monthly contracts received £2 5s, and carpenters claimed 4s a day to 
make shingles (an equivalent of £5 4s a month).9
 The bourgeois were separate from the original governing elite made up of the 
governor and his subordinates. These men included people like Charles Morris, 
James Monk, and Otis Little, who all came to Halifax from or via Massachusetts 
and made their living mainly by taking several government posts simultaneously. 
For example, in the early 1750s, Morris was chief surveyor of the colony and 
Monk his assistant, both were justices of the peace, and Morris was registrar of 
the Court of Vice Admiralty, later replaced by Monk. The merchants profited from 
government largesse and contracts, too: Mauger’s early fortunes came from his 
monopolies in supplying the navy and in distilling, but the merchants and traders 
for the most part did not at first sit on the governor’s council or otherwise assume 
an official role in government.
 The law offered an early point of conflict as Ephraim Cook, Joshua Mauger, 
and other colonial bourgeois faced off against the governors, Charles Morris, 
James Monk, and others charged with establishing the colonial state. In the years 
immediately following the founding of Halifax as the new capital of Nova Scotia, 
the legal authority of the governor, the courts, and the bench faced significant 
pressure. Seemingly minor disputes over property, trade, and reputation became 
intense conflicts over the colony’s law and authority. The law was a necessary 
ground for the battle because the colonial bourgeois made great use of the courts 
and desired a legal system that understood and responded to their practices and 
needs. The rules and structures of the common law and English statutory law 
already, in 1749, served them well, but the bourgeois desired a system that was 
open to local innovations that even better met their needs. In a handful of conflicts 
Salter and the twentieth-century Canadian bourgeoisie analysed in Don Nerbas, Dominion of Capital: The 
Politics of Big Business and the Crisis of the Canadian Bourgeoisie, 1914-1947 (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2013).
7 Donald F. Chard, “Mauger, Joshua” in Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol. 4, ed. Francess G. Halpenny 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), pp. 403-405.
8 Nova Scotia Archives and Records Management [hereafter NSARM], RG 37 (hx) vol. 2 #85, Janssen v. 
Cook.
9 For sailors: NSARM RG 37 (hx) vol. 1 #87, Chellis v. Power; and vol. 2 #86, Haggerty v. Power. For 
labourer: NSARM RG 39 “c” (hx) vol. 2 #26a, Wright v. Haislop. For carpenter: NSARM RG 39 “c” (hx) 
vol. 3 #70c, Brackett v. Cowie.
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with the governing elite in and outside of courtrooms between 1749 and 1753, 
the Halifax bourgeoisie forced a variety of concessions that made law in Halifax 
a bourgeois law. An analysis of these disputes illuminates the class nature of law 
and the contingency of legal authority in new colonies in the British empire and 
the early modern Atlantic world.10
 No particular law or legal system is a necessary prerequisite for commerce, 
but some laws and systems can be more bourgeois than others. The conflicts here 
tracked and helped lead the establishment of courts, the change in legal rules 
and law enforcement practices, and the composition of the bench. In established 
societies, even colonial ones, the making of bourgeois law can take a great deal 
of time.11 In a newly colonial moment, when no state or practice of law is firmly 
established, the changes can be more rapid, the conflicts between bourgeois and 
state officials more blatant, and the resultant limits on the state’s relative autonomy 
more public and significant. The bourgeois victories described here did not fully 
subordinate government officials of the colony, but they revealed the extent to 
which those officials were prepared to take direction. They made it more possible 
for the merchantocracy to establish itself than may have happened elsewhere, 
even in the colonial world.
 All of these disputes occurred when the bench, the bar, and the law-making 
governor and council included no one who had any extensive legal education or 
experience before arriving in the colony. Legal rule by amateurs was not, however, 
exceptional for colonies in the British Empire in the eighteenth century. Nor, in 
many ways, was it particularly unique for established colonies or England itself: 
the magistracy was overwhelmingly untrained in law, although its members sat 
alone, in pairs, or in Quarter Sessions in England or in County and Inferior Courts 
in the colonies.12
 This article describes and analyses three moments in Halifax’s legal history. 
It opens with the first civil dispute, which led to the founding of the colony’s 
County Court (which in turn became its Inferior Court of Common Pleas). It then 
shifts to a challenge of judicial authority and colonial law enforcement policy in 
10 The discussion today is still shaped in large part by the arguments about class, law, and economy spurred 
by Douglas Hay, “Property, Authority and the Criminal Law” in Douglas Hay, Peter Linebaugh, John Rule, 
E. P. Thompson, and Cal Winslow, eds., Albion’s Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth Century 
England (London: Allan Lane, 1975), pp. 17-64; Morton Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 
1780-1860 (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1977); and G. R. Rudin and David Sugarman, 
eds., Law, Economy and Society, 1750-1914 : Essays in the History of English Law (London: Professional 
Books, 1984). The Canadian legal history debate on these topics can be traced in the work of Paul Craven, 
Judy Fudge, R. C. B. Risk, and Eric Tucker, among others. The particularities of colonial situations are 
addressed in Lauren Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400-1900 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
11 Two classic examples of this narrative are Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, and P. S. Atiyah, 
The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979).
12 For a good brief introduction to colonial governance that bears similarities to the Nova Scotian experience, 
see Mary Sarah Bilder, “English Settlement and Local Governance” in Michael Grossberg and Christopher 
Tomlins, eds., The Cambridge History of Law in America, Vol. 1: Early America (1580-1815) (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 79-103. Paul Craven describes in detail local rule by justices 
of the peace for nineteenth-century New Brunswick in Petty Justice: Low Law and the Sessions System 
in Charlotte County, New Brunswick, 1785-1867 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press for the Osgoode 
Society, 2014), pp. 323-457.
5the colony’s court of Vice Admiralty. The largest part recounts the events of the 
“Justices’ Affair” of 1752. The disputes did not create the merchant-bourgeois 
predominance in Halifax. Rather, the disputes show how quickly that class 
came together to assert its interests and how receptive the government was to 
acquiesce, even when the governor, his council, and the judges claimed they were 
not. The governing elites’ acquiescence helped to ensure that the bench and law 
enforcement better reflected bourgeois power and interests in the colony. These 
disputes did not, in the end, create one law for the rich and one for the poor, but a 
common law for everyone that met bourgeois needs and expectations.13
Ephraim Cook and Establishing Civil Justice in Halifax
Halifax’s Chebucto Harbor is naturally large, even at its narrowest points, and 
eighteenth-century ships were small by modern standards. Even so, ships could 
float into each other, even while anchored. One night in early September 1749, 
Elijah Davis’s sloop slipped its mooring and floated toward Ephraim Cook’s 
Baltimore. Sailors called out warnings, but the ships’ bowsprits crossed each other. 
When bowsprits crossed they could get seriously entangled and damage sails 
and rigging, pivoting the ships into each other and with each collision seriously 
injuring their hulls, sails, and crew. Everyone on board the ships wanted them 
separated as soon as possible. Both crews tried desperately to push the ships apart 
with poles and untangle the rigging. Into the mess ran the mate of the Baltimore, 
carrying an axe and commanding that Davis’s ship push back and away. When 
it could not, he began to hack at Davis’s bowsprit. Crew from that sloop called 
at him to stop, but he swung away, chopping through rope and wood. With the 
bowsprit cut off, the ships drifted apart, but the Baltimore’s mate had seriously 
damaged Davis’s schooner.
 On September 6, 1749, Davis went to Governor Cornwallis’s ship Beaufort 
to ask the governor and his appointed council of twelve men for redress for 
the damage to his schooner. Although Governor Cornwallis had instructions to 
establish courts following the Virginian example, little had been accomplished 
by September.14 Cornwallis had also delayed in relocating the Vice Admiralty 
court from Annapolis Royal to Halifax.15 Without courts, the governor and his 
council would have to suffice for justice to be served. Davis was the first person to 
ask the governor and council to resolve a legal dispute for damage. They did not 
relish taking on the task and asked Davis and Cook each to appoint an arbitrator 
who would, in turn, appoint a third. Cook and Davis agreed and accepted that 
13 This article is about the struggle for bourgeois law; the content of the law in practice is analysed in James 
Muir, Law, Debt, and Merchant Power: The Civil Courts of 18th Century Halifax (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press for the Osgoode Society, 2016).
14 On July 18, 1749, he had issued a commission naming four Justices of the Peace, and at the end of August 
they sat as a general court, hearing a murder trial among other things, but they did not take any civil 
jurisdiction (NSARM RG 1 vol. 186, p. 5 and 15). See also Jim Phillips, “The Criminal Trial in Nova 
Scotia, 1749-1815” in G. Blain Baker and Jim Phillips, eds., Essays in the History of Canadian Law 
Volume Eight – In Honour of R. C. B. Risk (Toronto: University of Toronto Press for the Osgoode Society, 
1999), pp. 471-472.
15 Arthur J. Stone, “The Vice Admiralty Court in Colonial Nova Scotia,” Dalhousie Law Journal, vol. 17 
(1994), pp. 364, 368.
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the arbitrators’ decision would be final. Cook and Davis appointed two ship-
masters, Captains Nevin and Forester, and they appointed Captain John Rous, 
naval commander at Halifax, as the third. Rous wrote an award finding some fault 
on both sides and demanding each master to pay for the other ship’s damages, 
leaving Cook owing the balance to Davis of £14 18s 6d.16
 Cornwallis accepted the decision, and on September 20 he had an order drawn 
up requiring Cook to pay Davis. He affixed his seal to the order and gave it to 
a courier to deliver to Cook and the Baltimore. Aboard ship, the courier gave 
Cook the order, asking for repayment or, failing that, the order itself, to return to 
Cornwallis unfulfilled. Cook declared he had no intention of paying it or returning 
the order to the governor’s messenger. The courier’s return empty-handed incensed 
Cornwallis. Order in the colony relied on everyone respecting the governor’s 
authority in these early weeks of the settlement. Other normal state and non-
state structures of authority, like the courts or patron-client relationships, were 
either embryonic or non-existent. At the same time the colonists feared both the 
Mi’kmaq and the French, and they had to ensure sufficient shelter for themselves, 
their livestock, and food stores before the fast approaching winter. A clear line of 
authority from the governor down, with respect for the governor’s commands and 
for his men, would ensure the building and security of the colony.
 Cook was not simply a common seaman or person of the lower orders. Master 
of his ship, he came to Halifax with the intention of establishing himself in 
the colony. He was not appointed to council, but counted councillors like John 
Salusbury, Register and Receiver of his Majesty’s Rents, among his friends. If 
a man of some stature refused to acknowledge the governor’s commands, he 
visibly questioned the whole structure of authority in the colony, possibly even 
undermining it.
 Cornwallis would have none of Cook’s insubordination. Nor would the council: 
Salusbury recorded in his journal, “Cook a fool but the stream very much against 
him.” Cornwallis immediately summoned Cook to the Beaufort. Cook claimed 
that the owner of the Baltimore (Cook’s unnamed employer) would compensate 
Cook only if he or the Baltimore were legally held or seized, in effect asserting 
that Cornwallis and the council had not acted as a legitimate legal decision-
making body. The governor satisfied Cook’s needs, issuing a warrant to the 
Provost Marshal to execute the order against Cook and a second order that banned 
Cook from going ashore until he apologized in writing and asked the governor for 
his pardon.17 Cook realized the seriousness of the new order, if not of his actions. 
Returning to the Beaufort, he begged the governor’s apology and presented a 
letter of promise to pay the award.18
16 The damages to Cook’s ship Rous reported were: “timberhead 10s, Stancheon and Rail 15s, Driven Boom 
5s, Coller of the Mizon Sail & Ratlings 7/6, Boat 10s”; the damages to Davis’s schooner were: “jib stay 
[£]1 10s, Bowsprit: shrouds [£]2 Horses 5s Downhalls 10s Bowsprit [£]1, Vessels being detain’d Eight 
days [£]12” (NSARM RG 1 vol .163, pp. 14, 15).
17 John Salusbury, Expeditions of Honour, Ronald Rompkey ed. (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2011), p. 66. See also the council’s minutes, NSARM RG 1 vol. 186, mfm 15287, p. 21, 
September 20, 1749.
18 NSARM RG 1 vol. 186, pp. 26, 27, 29. A year later, on August 29, 1750, the governor reported to the 
7 The Davis-Cook conflict was the first instance of a civil dispute brought 
before the governor and council, underscoring the necessity of establishing a civil 
court structure to match the colony’s criminal General Court. In December the 
council devised a court system modelled somewhat after the Laws of Virginia, 
which included two levels of common law courts: a County and General Court. 
The Country Court’s bench would be made up of the Justices of the Peace sitting 
together, while the General Court’s bench would be the governor and council.19 
In 1752 the civil side of the County Court was rechristened the Inferior Court of 
Common Pleas while the criminal side became the Quarter Sessions, following 
New England naming practices. The civil side of the courts would have been 
established at some point, and Davis’s complaint to Cornwallis might have 
encouraged the governor and council to act more quickly. Cook’s resistance to the 
governor’s order, however, made the courts immediately necessary.
Thomas Power, the Merchants, and Vice Admiralty’s Authority
A little more than a year later, on Wednesday, December 5, 1750, navy Captain 
John Rous brought information to the court of Vice Admiralty alleging that 
merchant and fisher Thomas Power’s sloop Catherine had landed a variety of 
goods of foreign manufacture, including brandy and wine, in contravention of 
the Navigation Acts. Benjamin Green, Vice Admiralty judge and member of the 
governor’s council, issued an order to arrest the Catherine, which was affixed to 
the mainmast of Power’s sloop. The trial began at 3 p.m. on December 7 in the 
house of Vice Admiralty Registrar and Justice of the Peace Charles Morris. Power 
and any others concerned were expected to attend.20
 The first day of the trial progressed much like other Vice Admiralty trials for 
breaches of the Navigation Acts. Several witnesses described Power’s summer 
activities. The Catherine and another ship he owned, the Francis, had sailed from 
Halifax in March 1750 to fish on the Grand Banks. In August both vessels put 
in at Louisbourg. After leaving Louisbourg, the two ships met in a bay along the 
Cape Breton coast. Power transferred from the Francis to the Catherine “[cherry] 
Brandy, seven loafs of sugar a large scuare box ... and some Quantity of Silk 
and Worsted stockings,” along with additional goods taken on at Louisbourg. 
John Owen, master of the Francis, claimed that only a seventh of the Louisbourg 
brandy remained on the Francis, implying that all of the other Louisbourg goods 
were meant for trade rather than consumption.
 The Francis separated from the Catherine on the fishing bank and eventually 
sailed north because of weather to St. Peter’s Bay in Newfoundland for 
council that Cook had still not paid Davis the damages awarded. The council ordered “that proper Methods 
be taken to oblige him to pay the Sum awarded without Delay.” The governor ordered the Provost Marshal 
once again to seek the funds and, if Cook refused, to distrain a sufficient amount of Cook’s “goods” to 
cover the award if he refused to pay on the spot. Whether this was successful or not is unrecorded (NSARM 
RG 1 vol. 186, p. 75). A case with very similar facts and again involving Cook as defendant was brought 
to the court of Vice Admiralty in February 1750. Cook lost again (Cook v. Cook, NSARM RG 1 vol. 491, 
pp.18-30).
19 NSARM RG 1 vol. 186, pp. 30-40; NSARM RG 37 (hx) vol. A.
20 NSARM RG 1 vol. 491, pp. 158-164, R. v. Power.
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reprovisioning. It returned to Halifax sometime after Power and the Catherine. 
Members of the Catherine’s crew testified that they had consumed some of the 
goods taken from the Francis, but said that they took ashore some of the brandy, 
wine, and sugar when the Catherine returned to Halifax in September.
 Although they were not at war in 1750, tensions between the French and 
English remained high. Many fishing vessels from Halifax put in to Louisbourg, 
causing suspicion of smuggling. Reprovisioning there was acceptable under the 
Navigation Acts, but only if the goods purchased in Louisbourg were consumed on 
board the ship and before anchoring in Halifax or elsewhere in British territory.21
 The trial resumed on Saturday afternoon and took an unusual tack. Joshua 
Mauger appeared before the court desiring to present a letter addressed to Judge 
Green from the merchants of Halifax in support of and written at the request of 
Power. Mauger’s letter was an indictment of the colonial government and the 
enforcement of imperial statutes. The letter and Mauger’s presentation cast 
merchants, fishers, and others who invested in trade and production as the true 
builders of the colony. Allied against them were their servants22 and the colony’s 
government. Power’s prosecution seemed to demonstrate that the security of 
bourgeois investments and activities was not of great enough concern to the 
colony’s courts. To the merchants’ minds, justice required the law of the colony to 
change.
 Mauger set out several specific grievances.23 First, he complained about the 
use of informants. Rous had learned of Power’s trip into Louisbourg and the 
liquor from loose talk among common sailors. To allow the chief naval officer to 
make arrests based on such information put all owners of vessels “at the Will and 
Pleasure of Drunken Idle fishermen or Sailors.” The idea that merchants and other 
bourgeois should be threatened by vexatious court actions launched by or based 
on information from their subordinates was anathema.
 Second, Mauger questioned the timing of the arrest: for merchants to be 
able to invest and expand their activity in the colony, they needed to know their 
investments were secure. In this case, the Catherine had been arrested more than 
two months after it had returned to Halifax. If Power lost the trial, the ship would 
be auctioned and the proceeds split between the government and the informer. 
Mauger asserted:
no Person will be safe in purchasing vessells in this Settlement, as the property 
cannot be made good to him, whilst it is in the Power of the Captains of his 
Majesty’s Ships to take Cognizance of past Offences.... I am almost Confident that 
every Vessel belonging to America have more or Less Clandestinely rund Goods or 
Merchandise for their Own Use.
21 On the enforcement of Navigation Acts in other parts of British North America, see David R. Owen 
and Michael C. Tolley, Courts of Admiralty in Colonial America, the Maryland Experience, 1634-1776 
(Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1995), pp. 102-103, 133-136, and 101-136 generally.
22 At the same time as the Vice Admiralty suit, Power was being sued in the Inferior Court of Common Pleas 
by John Owen and other members of the Francis’s crew for their share of the summer’s catch. See NSARM 
RG 37 (hx) vol. 1 # 85, 86, 87, 88, Owen v. Power, Hagarty v. Power, Chellis v. Power, Oakes v. Power, 
and Power v. Owen.
23 The letter is transcribed in the Vice Admiralty record book (R. v. Power).
9Rather, the colonial government and Vice Admiralty should “[a]ssist the Poor 
[meaning the bourgeois] rather than distress them” and encourage investment 
rather than add to the investor’s uncertainties. One way to do so would be to 
secure merchants’ property regardless of a previous owner’s infractions. Mauger’s 
premise was inapplicable to Power’s case, however: Power was, and remained, 
owner of the Catherine and faced losing his property for his own alleged misdeeds.
 Mauger then offered a new interpretation of the facts of Power’s case, defending 
Power’s actions on the grounds of good economy and bad crews. Power went 
to Louisbourg, not with the intention of illegal trade, but because he needed to 
reprovision his schooners. Until that point, Mauger contends, the catches of both 
the Francis and the Catherine had been poor “owing to ill success and in some 
Measure to the ill behaviour of the Crew of the Francis.” Louisbourg was much 
closer to the fishing grounds than Halifax, and Power did not wish to expend more 
resources than necessary on a time-consuming and unproductive provisioning run. 
Once in Louisbourg, not only did Power provision the ships with brandy and wine, 
but with bread and meat (not previously introduced into evidence). The volume of 
provisions, including the alcohol, amounted to no more than would be expected 
to provision two schooners with a total complement of sixteen men. His actions 
were not those of a wily smuggler but a good businessman, concerned to earn as 
high a return as possible on his investment. He acted not to cheat the Imperial 
government but out of necessity.
 To account for why so much of the brandy remained on the Catherine, Mauger 
explained that the crew of the Francis “made bad use of Liquor and thereby 
neglected their Duty.” Power intended the two schooners to fish together, and he 
would pass alcohol (and other provisions) over to the Francis as required. The two 
vessels separated on the Banks, however, leaving Power with 18 gallons of spirits, 
as well as wine and sugar, when the Catherine returned to port. He carried these 
ashore “in Order to secure it from the Crew of the Vessel who would probably 
have bad of it if it had been left on board.”
 Mauger then addressed whether entering Louisbourg to trade should be 
assumed a breach of the Acts. He argued that a man, “under Necessity of pursuing 
his Lawfull business for a livelihood for himself and Family,” should be given 
leeway. In provisioning his vessels it was better to trade, even with a foreign nation, 
than to steal his necessities (a fair enough point, perhaps, but the Navigation Acts 
did not advocate stealing over trade). In fact, Mauger stated, this sort of trading 
was “lawfully allowed to be done in all Parts of the known World.”
 In closing, Mauger appealed directly to Green and more broadly to the governor 
and Green’s fellow councillors. He complimented Green on the good principles 
and leniency that he had so far demonstrated in his tenure. Mauger then prayed 
Green
and all other Gentlemen who are in the Legislature of this Infant Colony will prove 
Fathers to the Poor Inhabitants who all greatly stand in need of Favours or at least 
Indulgences and not to suffer any of them to be oppressed by evil minded men who 
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(as the vulgar saying is in our Mother Country[)] care not who sinks if they can but 
swim.
To be clear as to who the evil-minded men were, Mauger then described the crew 
of the Francis, “who have not caught fish enough in the whole Season to pay 
their Wages and now are so Vile as to Strike at the Root in Order to Compleat the 
Poor oppressed Man by their Malicious and badly grounded Informations and 
making mountains of mole Hills.”24 This conclusion returned to the class politics 
that Mauger used to open his address. The merchants of Halifax, like Power and 
himself, were “Poor Inhabitants” striving to make a better colony. They faced off 
against “evil minded” sailors and other labourers who acted selfishly on their own 
greed to the detriment of both the merchants and the new colony.
 Mauger’s appeal left Otis Little, advocate general of the court prosecutor of 
Thomas Power, unmoved. The case, Little argued, was simple and proven. Power 
had imported goods illegally into the colony. Nothing else was material.
 When Benjamin Green issued his decree the following Monday, he began by 
acknowledging Power’s defence that he had gone to Louisbourg not to deceive 
but for necessities. Similarly, he recognized the feelings behind the merchants’ 
plea not to prosecute “inconsiderable and inadvertent” breaches of the Navigation 
Acts. But Green was troubled. Ruling in favour of Power (and Mauger) was not a 
favourable policy for the colony
if any one then every one of the Fishing Vessels belonging to this Place may with 
Impunity upon the Plea of Necessity either fictitious or if real perhaps owing to 
negligence or misconduct make Lewisburg the Magasine and Market from whence 
to furnish themselves ... and the Merchant here may shut up his storehouses whilst 
french Brandy can be purchased cheaper then [sic] English rum[.]
Green’s solution was to refrain from deciding. Green ordered Power to give a 
bond with two sureties to satisfy a ruling of the court to be made within twelve 
months. In the meantime, Green declared he would seek guidance from the Board 
of Trade and the High Court of Admiralty in England. I have found no record of 
an eventual ruling.25
 Judge Green and other colonial officials found themselves caught between 
local interests on the one side and imperial expectations and orders on the other. 
Faced with a challenge from an organized merchant community that was presented 
by one of the most prominent of that group, Green and the naval officers backed 
down. Enforcement of the Navigation Acts tapered off in the months that followed. 
Of the 15 prosecutions for illegal trade in Halifax’s Vice Admiralty courts prior to 
1766, five came from 1749-1750 and three more from 1751-1752; the remaining 
seven came after the fall of Louisbourg in 1757 and never more than two a year. 
24 R. v. Power.
25 The High Court of Admiralty had no jurisdiction over the Navigation Acts. Instead, all cases in England 
were to be tried at a court of record in Westminster, by practice the Court of Exchequer. As a reference, this 
case would have gone to the Board of Trade whose members may have referred it elsewhere as they saw 
necessary. See Owen and Tolley, Courts of Admiralty, p. 106.
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Not only did the intensity decline after Power’s trial; the focus changed as well. 
After 1750, only two prosecutions under the Navigation Acts included Haligonians 
among the defendants, while they were the defendants in all five of the 1749-1750 
trials. After Mauger’s intervention in Power’s case, enforcement of the Navigation 
Acts was dedicated to smugglers from away.
 Mauger did not act simply out of concern for Power or even the merchant 
community as a whole. Mauger, along with many of both the English and New 
England merchants and officials settled in Halifax, had been among those occupying 
Louisbourg between 1745 and 1749. When the British returned Louisbourg to the 
French, the British authorities gave the vacating occupiers time to dispose of their 
property there and remove all of their possessions. Mauger appears to have used 
this loophole in the otherwise strict trading regulations to import wine, rum, and 
other goods from Louisbourg in 1750 and 1751. In November of 1751, James 
Monk, acting on the governor’s orders, searched several of Mauger’s warehouses 
in Halifax and impounded French rum. Mauger argued that when he closed 
accounts in Louisbourg in 1749 he was forced to grant a great deal of credit and 
that even in 1751 he could only be paid back in goods like rum and molasses. 
The court of Vice Admiralty accepted his argument and allowed him to keep the 
seized goods.26 Mauger’s defence of Power was part of a long fight with Halifax’s 
government over trade law and policy. It was a fight Governor Cornwallis was 
unable to win. W. A. B. Douglas concludes that Cornwallis’s “inability either to 
impress Mauger with the majesty of the law or to establish any principle against 
smuggling is mute evidence of the hopelessness of the cause which attempted to 
combat the practice.”27
 The Power case made a good platform for Mauger. If Power’s explanation 
was to be believed (and Little’s witnesses did not contest it), then Power’s illegal 
goods had been brought to Halifax because of a combination of problems with his 
fishing expedition and not with the intention to smuggle. Having not consumed 
the goods at sea, he could either order them destroyed or hope to make some use 
of them in Halifax despite the trade ban. Power’s situation provided a sympathetic 
example of the problems the trade laws posed to legitimate bourgeois in the 
colony. In his defence of Power, Mauger could attack law enforcement policy 
directly and argue that the colony’s governing elite in the navy, on the bench, and 
in the governor’s circle did not have the colony’s best interests in mind. It appears 
to have convinced them to change their practice, even if Green would not publicly 
acknowledge a change by finding for Power.
Ephraim Cook and Contempt of Court
In the next moment of major conflict between the bourgeoisie and the government 
over the practice of law, once again Ephraim Cook was at the centre of the dispute 
at first, though Mauger led the bourgeois agitators in the end. Ephraim Cook 
26 Donald F. Chard, “Mauger, Joshua,” in DCB, vol. 4, p. 526; see also A. A. Mackenzie, “Zouberbuhler, 
Sebastian,” in DCB, vol. 4, p. 780.
27 W. A. B. Douglas, “Halifax as an Element of Sea Power 1749-1766” (MA thesis, Dalhousie University, 
1966), p. 48.
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became one of the leading men in the colony. Legal documents referred to Cook 
as both merchant and esquire; someone who engaged in trade of significant value 
beyond the colony had the status of a colonial gentleman. Despite his conflict with 
the governor in the fall of 1749, Cornwallis appointed him a justice of the peace in 
1750. His tenure as a justice of the peace ended in a fight with his fellow justices 
and the governor’s council in the summer of 1752 and led the Halifax judiciary 
into the greatest bourgeois and popular challenge to its authority in this period, 
the Justices’ Affair. 
 As a justice, Cook could hear some matters summarily and could attend as 
one of the justices who made up the bench at the Inferior Court of Common Pleas 
(originally the County Court) and the Quarter Sessions. On July 9, 1752, William 
Steele, a member of the governor’s council, along with most of the justices of 
the peace for Halifax in a petition to the council accused Cook of defaming and 
assaulting Steele and demeaning and arguing with his fellow justices. The council 
ordered a hearing for July 13. Cook refused to attend, claiming illness.28 After 
questioning his physician, the council decided Cook could attend and found him 
in contempt. It ordered a second hearing on the petitions for July 17,29 which Cook 
attended.
 Steele accused Cook of calling him “a fool a scoundrel a blackguard and 
villain” and threatening him with a stick. Cook countered that Steele owed him 
money, but Steele produced a receipt showing the debt had already been paid. 
In response, Cook called Steele, in front of the council “a dirty fellow.” While 
the defamation and assault were proved, the council was unprepared to act as 
the General Court on this matter, even though it was Steele’s prerogative to ask 
them to do so. Rather, they declared that Cook was “liable to a prosecution at 
Common Law ... for his abuse and Insults to Mr Steele” and left it to Steele to sue 
or prosecute Cook.30
 The council also addressed the complaints about Cook’s behaviour as a justice, 
determining that Cook had “behaved in a very indecent and unjustifiable manner 
towards [the other justices] ... by taxing them with illegal practices and saying 
openly in the face of the Country that they were incapable of determining points 
of law.” They recommended that Cook be “severely reprimanded ... [and] be 
removed from the Commission of a Justice of the Inferior Court and Justice of the 
Peace.”31
 Finally, the council ordered Cook “to be committed to his Majesty’s Goal 
[sic] until further order of the council” for skipping the first hearing and acting 
contemptuous at the second.32 After a night in jail, Cook wrote to the council to 
apologize. Later that morning he promised the council in person that he would 
make a public apology to Steele the following Monday. The council discharged 
Cook.
28 NSARM RG 1 vol. 209, p. 163.
29 Ibid., pp. 164-165.
30 NSARM RG 1 vol. 209, pp. 167-168. All references to the second hearing are to these pages of the Council 
minutes.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
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 The same day Governor Cornwallis issued a new general commission of the 
justices of the peace. William Bourne now joined Charles Morris, James Monk, 
John Duport, Joseph Scott, and Robert Ewer. Ephraim Cook was left off the 
commission, which meant he was no longer a justice.33 Whether or not Cook 
understood that being left off the commission was sufficient to remove him, he 
maintained to some at least that he was still a justice under the older commission. 
When presented with an action against fisher John Grace, Cook committed him to 
jail prior to trial.
 At the December Quarter Sessions, Otis Little, this time in his role as the King’s 
Attorney in Halifax, prosecuted Cook for impersonating a justice of the peace and 
illegally imprisoning Grace. David Lloyd, lawyer and clerk of the Inferior Court 
and Quarter Sessions, represented Cook. At trial, Cook decried the proceedings 
and verbally abused the justices. In response they found him in contempt and had 
him jailed again. The trial continued after Cook’s removal from the court, and 
the jury found for Grace, awarding him only £5 instead of the demanded £290 
in damages. Following the jury’s verdict, Lloyd moved to arrest the judgment, 
arguing that it was contrary to the law (the details of his argument were not 
recorded). The justices considered the motion, found it insufficient, and passed 
judgment against Cook for the £5 and costs of £1 17s 5d.34
 The next morning the justices met in conference to decide Cook’s punishment 
for the contempt of court, including Lloyd in the conference. At first some justices 
suggested fining Cook up to £500 for contempt; in the end they settled for a 
fine of only £20 with a £500 surety for good behaviour for one year. Lloyd later 
asserted that during the conference he argued that Cook had “full[y] complied 
with the Recognizances given the [sic] overnight for his appearing and readiness 
to make concessions,” and so should not be subject to the surety. To this, Justice 
James Monk replied “in a great passion that he knew Lloyd would find some dirty 
quibble to get his client off.”35
 It appeared to several in Halifax that Cook’s fate at the hands of the justices 
was just one more example of the justices’ over-reaching their authority. Other 
incidents had led to a building frustration with the justices on the part of merchants 
and others in the colonial capital.36
 In September 1752, just weeks before he intended to leave Halifax for good, 
the merchant Francis Martin sued Joseph Fairbanks for defamation at the Inferior 
Court.37 The jury awarded Martin only £5 in damages, much less than the £500 he 
demanded. Martin sought leave to appeal the decision to the General Court. The 
33 NSARM RG 1 vol. 209, pp. 171-173. See also Ronald Rompkey, “Introduction” in Salusbury, Expeditions 
of Honour, pp. 47-48. Norma Landau notes for England in the eighteenth century, the “usual method of 
removing a justice was simply omission of the justice’s name from the commission on its renewal.” See 
Landau, The Justices of the Peace, 1679-1760 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p. 126. See 
also Craven, Petty Justice, pp. 193-199.
34 NSARM RG 1 vol. 209, pp. 262-263, 270, 290; RG 37 a2, pp. 245-250; Salusbury, Expeditions of Honour, 
p. 129.
35 NSARM RG 1 vol. 209, p. 270.
36 Another example is Henry Sibley’s case: NSARM RG 1 vol. 209, p. 270.
37 There were seven actions between Fairbanks and Martin tried at the inferior court; see NSARM RG 37 A2. 
pp. 183-184, 186, 194-205, 260-264, 295-303.
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justices denied him his motion. He petitioned the council, which ruled he could 
sue Fairbanks again at the December Inferior Court. An appeal to the General 
Court would have been heard in October, so re-trial at the Inferior Court delayed 
his leaving two more months. Martin held the justices responsible.38
 Before Guy Fawkes Day in November 1752, Governor Hopson39 outlawed 
parading and the carrying or burning of effigies to celebrate the holiday.40 Despite 
the ban, several townspeople made effigies and paraded. Blacksmith James 
Brennock, among others, got into a fight with the paraders. Following the melee, 
only Brennock and his allies were charged with rioting and tried at the December 
Quarter Sessions. At trial, their counsel argued that his clients were only responding 
to a riot led by the prosecutors, who were acting in direct contravention of the 
governor’s orders. He attempted to cross-examine the plaintiffs’ witnesses in an 
effort to have them admit to breaching the governor’s proclamation. He tried to 
call witnesses to provide evidence of the plaintiffs’ behaviour on Guy Fawkes 
Day, including some witnesses who had not been present at the melee. The 
justices refused to allow the defence lawyer to present any of these arguments, 
questioning, or evidence.41
 Cook’s case would be the kindling to a fire fuelled by many complaints, but 
someone else would have to set it all ablaze: intentionally or not, David Lloyd, 
Cook’s lawyer and clerk of the court, played this role.
The Justices’ Affair
At the beginning of the day’s sitting of the Quarter Sessions on December 27, 
1752, Lloyd presented the court with a written account of the treatment he had 
received from the justices. Lloyd claimed he had shown fidelity to the court until 
this point, “more ... than on all circumstances considered could be Ever Expected 
from him.” In exchange he had been poorly treated. As clerk for three years, he 
had been paid a total of £25, not enough to cover his “pen ink and paper or his bare 
attendance in Court.” Lloyd had complained about his pay seven weeks earlier, 
without success. He hinted of suffering several other abuses at the hands of the 
justices, writing:
[In Halifax,] detraction and scandal so much prevails where Integrity honesty or a 
good name are not always allowed to be props of Office.... [It was thus] not prudent 
to submit his Character to the discussion of his Enemies, Judging it more proper to 
stop staff in hand until he hears who would accuse him or until he knows whether 
he is not to be gratified for his service before he proceeds further in the business of 
38 NSARM RG 37 A2, Martin v. Fairbanks; RG 1 vol. 209, pp. 212, 268-269.
39 Peregrine Hopson replaced Edward Cornwallis as governor in the late summer of 1752.
40 On state disapproval of Guy Fawkes celebrations in England by mid-century, see James McConnel, 
“Remembering the 1605 Gunpowder Plot in Ireland, 1605-1920,” Journal of British Studies, vol. 50 
(October 2011), p. 873. On the limitations on its celebration in New England in the eighteenth century, see 
James Sharpe, Remember Remember: A Cultural History of Guy Fawkes Day (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2005), pp. 141-145.
41 NSARM RG 1 vol. 209, pp. 269-270, 286-289.
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the Sessions. For that his office has been attached with great trouble little profit and 
at this time less reputation.42
After reading his complaints out loud, Lloyd presented the court with a copy, sent 
another copy to the governor and council, and withdrew his services as clerk.
 Justices Morris, Monk, Duport, and Bourne submitted a defence to the council 
two days later. They argued that Lloyd’s declaration of his previous fidelity 
effectively asserted that the justices’ recent behaviour had become “so particularly 
base or unlawfull [sic] as to absolve him from his fidelity.” The justices protested 
that Lloyd had libelled them and the governor and council, as the only other 
officers of Nova Scotia. The justices were particularly insulted by the fact that 
Lloyd had sent his complaint to the council, because this action implied that the 
justices would not take his complaints seriously or present them fairly to the 
governor and council (who set the court fees charged to litigants that paid the 
clerk). They argued that Lloyd was using his memorial and strike to continue to 
fight Cook’s case through other means. According to the justices, by making his 
memorial so soon after the final judgment in the case, Lloyd intended to “further 
inflame” the people of the colony and “to render the authority of the same court 
contemptable.”43
 Inflame Lloyd did. On the same day the justices replied, the governor and 
council received a memorial supporting Lloyd and questioning the conduct of the 
justices in the cases of Cook, Martin, and Brennock, among others. Led by Joshua 
Mauger, the fourteen subscribers to this memorial included some of the other 
leading merchants in the colony like Edmund Crawley, John Webb, and Sebastian 
Zouberbuhler. Others signatories were less prominent, like Mauger’s clerk Isaac 
Deschamps. Of the fourteen subscribers, all but William Nesbitt, attorney and 
one-time secretary to the governor, and perhaps Isaac Scott (about whom I can 
find nothing) were merchants or otherwise directly involved in trade in and out of 
the colony.
 In their memorial, they claimed to have “perceived much irregularity and ... 
partiality in the proceedings of the Inferior Court of Judicature lately held.” The 
subscribers asked the council to hold a public hearing into the court’s conduct “for 
the discovery of truths which may tend to the publick Good of the province, and to 
the redress of such Grievances as we labour under.”44 The citizens’ memorial left 
Councillor John Salusbury unimpressed, seeing it as just a continuation of Cook’s 
complaints: “Cook makes a party – and impeaches the Justices.... Wonderful that 
the people should be of Cook’s party, and yet all of them despise the Man.”45 
Regardless of whether or not they shared Salusbury’s opinion, the governor and 
rest of the council decided to hold a hearing into the matter on January 3, 1753.
 That morning Mauger and the others presented a second memorial. This one 
was more detailed, laying out in nine articles a general criticism of the justices, 
42 NSARM RG 1 vol. 209, pp. 260-263.
43 Ibid., pp. 260-261.
44 Ibid., p. 264.
45 Salusbury, Expeditions of Honour, p. 129.
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specific complaints relating to Martin’s, Brennock’s, and Cook’s cases, and (in the 
last article) a criticism of the King’s Attorney Otis Little. The second memorial had 
46 subscribers, self-identified as “the Merchants Traders and Principal Inhabitants 
of the Town of Halifax” and including all but Isaac Scott of the original memorial. 
Fourteen of these memorialists at some point called themselves merchants. Ten 
more were called traders, retailers, or truckmen and so engaged in commercial 
activity of some sort, although in terms of status and property only the traders 
were likely bourgeois. In addition to Nesbitt, the attorney Daniel Wood signed 
the second memorial. A number of artisans also signed the second memorial, 
including a blacksmith, two butchers, and three carpenters. Francis Martin signed 
both memorials, but Ephraim Cook, David Lloyd, and James Brennock did not, 
even though the second memorial relied on their experiences (Cook’s clerk Cyrus 
Jannin did sign). The memorialists were clearly drawn from among the business 
elite of the community, with further signatories from the colony’s professionals. 
Not all the memorialists were bourgeois, but the voice in the document came 
from that class in the colony. Subsequently the council minutes referred to the 
memorialists as “the inhabitants,” differentiating them from the officers of the 
court, but also (perhaps unintentionally) implying a broad popular support for 
their position among Haligonians.
 While the memorialists claimed to write on behalf of all Halifax, they did 
not have universal support. On January 9, 1753, “Sundry Merchants and other 
Inhabitants of the Town of Halifax” presented a counter-petition supporting the 
justices.46 The names and number of subscribers to this counter-petition are not 
recorded, and it seems to have not been given much consideration in the subsequent 
hearings.
 Four of the five justices entered a lengthy reply to the memorials. They 
began by asserting that, considering the “Dignity of their offices,” they should 
not be required to reply to such a public but essentially extra-legal device as the 
inhabitants’ memorial. They questioned the presumption of the memorialists to 
denote themselves “Merchants and principal Inhabitants,” as they were “but by 
far the inferior Part in number and Consequence” of the total inhabitants of the 
colony. Fearing that, by their silence, “some designing Persons might possibly 
have construed to the said Justices disadvantage,” the justices nevertheless 
responded to each of the inhabitants’ complaints.
 Of the four responding justices, Charles Morris, James Monk, and John 
Duport relied on government appointments for their livelihood, each having 
several appointments in the colonial state at the time. The fifth justice, Robert 
Ewer, was unique on the bench in December 1752 for making his living as a 
trader and merchant (in partnership with John Webb, one of the memorialists).47 
Ewer’s name never appears listed in the justices’ replies; in fact his name does 
46 NSARM RG 1 vol. 209, p. 277.
47 Phyllis R. Blakeley, “Monk, James,” in DCB, vol. 3;. Akins, Selections from the public documents of 
the province of Nova Scotia (Halifax: Charles Annand, 1869), p. 293, and History of Halifax, p. 10. The 
justices’ attorney Otis Little was born in Massachusetts, although from 1746 until 1749 he had been in 
London, advocating the colonization of Nova Scotia. After arriving in Halifax, Little relied on government 
commissions as well (J. M. Bumsted, “Little, Otis,” DCB, vol. 3, p. 404).
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not appear in the records of the Justices’ Affair until February 28, when he was 
recommissioned.48 Until he was removed from the commission, Cook had been the 
other representative of the bourgeois among the justices. Ewer was also the only 
one of the five justices in December 1752 that I can positively identify as coming 
to Halifax directly from England (as part of Cornwallis’s original convoy).
 Between January 10 and February 1 the council met 17 times to hear the 
evidence.49 The council then made its rulings over four sittings. On February 19, 
20, and 23 it issued rulings on the “Law and authorities,” while on March 1,1753, 
it issued its final ruling. The justices and Little responded to each of the articles in 
their written reply. The legal arguments in the affair turned on whether the source 
of the common law and legal practice in Halifax was England or Massachusetts. 
Yet the affair was about deeper strains in the community rather than the place of 
origin of settlers or their ideas of law.50 It served as cover for a conflict between 
the leaders of the colony’s merchants and the people in public office. The Justices’ 
Affair, like Power’s prosecution for illegal trading, draws attention to the position 
and legal expectations of Halifax’s merchant class and the willingness of the 
colony’s government to meet these expectations. The bourgeois’ memorials 
and justices’ reply forced the governor and council to address the quality of law 
available in the colony.
 The broad first article of the second memorial has received the most attention 
from scholars.51 It was a critique of the justices’ apparent reliance on Massachusetts 
law, rules, and practices:
[G]reat countenance and encouragement hath been frequently given by the said 
Judges to introduce the Laws and practice of the Massachusetts into the Court of 
Common pleas in this province which Laws however good and beneficial they 
may be to the Inhabitants of the Massachusetts yet we conceive are injurous and 
detrimental to numbers of people in this Colony.... [these practices] influence the 
minds of such Jurymen who have been bred under the Massachusetts Law and tend 
to divide the minds of the people who we Conceive are to be governed by the Laws 
and practices of England and this Province Only.
The justices replied: “the Laws of the Massachusetts have never been by them at 
any Time given in Charge to the Jury, or made use of on any decision whatsoever 
as a Rule to determining the Cause of Proceedings in the said Court.” They 
then called into question the legal knowledge of the inhabitants and asserted 
the importance of English common law in all of the North American colonies: 
48 See Donald F. Chard, “Mauger, Joshua”; Lois Kernaghan, “Nesbitt, William”; and A. A. Mackenzie, 
“Zouberbuhler, Sebastian,” all in DCB, vol. 4, pp. 525-529, 581-582, 780-781.
49 None of it is recorded in the council minutes nor discussed in other sources I could find about the Affair.
50 See Salusbury, Expeditions of Honour, p. 129. See more generally Brebner, The Neutral Yankees, pp. 15-
17, for a discussion of conflicts between settlers from England and North America in Halifax’s early years.
51 The longest discussion of it can be found in Barry Cahill, “‘How Far English Laws Are In Force Here’: 
Nova Scotia’s First Century of Reception Law Jurisprudence,” University of New Brunswick Law Journal, 
vol. 42 (1993), pp. 115-116. See, by contrary example, MacNutt’s description in The Atlantic Provinces: 
the courts’ “justices, unlearned but persistent, strove to enforce New England precedents, usually at the 
expense of those who came from elsewhere” (p. 55). Here MacNutt accepts the memorialists’ position 
completely and is wrong.
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“[T]he Libellers are utterly ignorant of the Rules and Practices of the Courts in 
New England for that in most points they are exactly Conformable to the Practice 
of his Majesty’s Courts at Westminster and the Common Law of England is in 
Force there as well as in all His Majesty’s Plantations in America.” Neither side 
was completely correct in its assertions.
 Monk and Morris had lived in Massachusetts prior to coming to Halifax, 
although Monk was born and raised in England. I cannot determine John Duport’s 
or William Bourne’s origins.
 As the subsequent articles demonstrated, the memorialists seemed to have 
had little accurate knowledge as to which laws, rules, and practices were North 
American, and which English, in origin. The justices’ assertion of the congruence 
of the rules and practices of New England and Westminster is generally accurate. 
Yet there were several specific differences, and in some cases, such as in appeals, 
Nova Scotia followed New England practice that was distinct from England.52
 Some evidence suggests that the memorialists may have been oppressed by 
the courts. In 1752, the signatories to the second memorial disproportionately 
had their actions abated or dismissed by the justices.53 Abatements and dismissals 
occurred when errors in law made by the plaintiff ended an action without trial. 
Although abatements and dismissals did not form part of the memorialists’ 
argument, the successful use of these procedures against their actions might have 
added to the sense that the justices were aligned against them. The inhabitants did 
not necessarily want English legal rules enforced instead of any Massachusetts (or 
other New England) legal rules imported to Halifax. They wanted the justices to 
enforce legal rules that would help the memorialists’ own cause. By smearing the 
legal decisions against them as contrary to English law and following that of New 
England, the memorialists were attacking Morris and Monk in particular without 
directly asserting that they were partial against the bourgeois and their allies.
 The second article focussed on Francis Martin’s case and alleged that the 
justices compelled Martin to postpone his plans to leave the colony. The justices 
asserted that they were following the council’s rules for appeals, which stated 
“that no appeal from the County court to the General Court be granted for any sum 
less then [sic] five pound.”54 Despite the memorialists’ first article denouncing 
New England law, Martin’s expectation that he could appeal at all relied more 
on North American practices than English ones. English practice required the 
use of the writs of certiorari or error to receive a re-hearing of a case, and both 
52 For a discussion of differences between Massachusetts and England, see, for example, William E. Nelson, 
The Americanization of the Common Law: The Impact of Legal Change on Massachusetts Society, 1760-
1830 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975) pp. 8-10, 30; on Connecticut and England, see 
Bruce Mann, Neighbors and Strangers: Law and Community in Early Connecticut (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1987), pp. 86, 127-128. This issue is taken up several times in William E. Nelson, 
The Common Law in America, vols. 1 and 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008 and 2013).
53 The memorialists were plaintiffs 83 times in 1752, accounting for 14 per cent of the 595 actions that year. 
Of these, 35 actions were abated in 1752, eight times (23 per cent) when one of the memorialists was a 
plaintiff; 23 actions were dismissed, five times (22 per cent) when one of the memorialists was a plaintiff. 
Memorialist defendants only successfully abated one action, and no actions against them were dismissed.
54 NSARM RG 1 vol. 209, p. 234; the rule was adopted by the governor and council on December 13, 1749 
(NSARM RG 37 hx vol. A).
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turned on demonstrating problems with justices’ actions in law. In the American 
colonies, appeals were effectively new trials on the matter when one party felt 
the ruling was wrong. If anything, the inhabitants wanted to see more, not less, 
Massachusetts influence on the law insofar as it offered them easy rights to appeal 
to a higher court.55
 Article three dealt with the Brennock riot prosecution and is an example of 
the memorialists essentially asking for a new, local set of rules. The inhabitants 
maintained that, by refusing to allow Brennock and his co-defendants to cross-
examine the prosecutor’s evidence or present their own witnesses, the justices 
had been unfair and ensured conviction. The justices claimed that they allowed all 
defendant examinations of the prosecution up to the point where the defendants 
attempted to compel the prosecution’s witnesses to “accuse themselves,” which 
“they had lawfull authority for refusing.” As for the defendants’ own evidence, a 
counter-accusation of prosecutor criminal behaviour was not a sufficient defence.56 
It is possible that the justices showed partiality in applying the rules more strictly 
to Brennock than in other cases, but their refusal to accept counter-accusation 
as a defence seems consistent with acceptable English practice. Finally, those 
witnesses not present at the riot may, by the mid-1700s, have been considered 
hearsay witnesses.57
 The next four articles in the inhabitants’ memorial all dealt with Cook’s trial 
and imprisonment in December. First, they maintained that, following Cook’s 
imprisonment for contempt of court, the trial continued without a defence, which, 
they asserted, led to his conviction. Second, the inhabitants claimed the private 
proceedings for determining Cook’s punishment for contempt were “high and 
Arbitrary proceedings of the said Justices [and] are a great and notorious violation 
of the rights and liberties of the King’s subjects and have an apparent tendency 
to discredit and ruin this Colony and are therefore great grievances.” Third, the 
inhabitants accused Morris and Monk of convincing attorney Little to feign an 
illness to delay Cook’s trial, inserting names of their choosing at the top of the list 
of jurors for the trial, browbeating Lloyd, and refusing to hear his motions. Fourth, 
in declaring during the trial Cook’s commission as JP “invalid and not good,” 
Morris was accused of derogating a commission granted by the king via the 
55 See Mary Sarah Bilder, “The Origin of Appeal in America,” Hastings Law Journal, vol. 48 (1996-1997), 
pp. 924-927, 943-946.
56 J. M. Beattie, Crime and the Courts in England 1660-1800 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986) 
pp. 346-352, 359-360.
57 For a contemporary discussion of hearsay, see Geoffrey Gilbert, The Law of Evidence [...] (Dublin: Sarah 
Cotter, 1754), p. 107. According to John Langbein, hearsay witnesses were allowed when their testimony 
“supplemented sworn testimony,” but John Beattie has suggested that “by the middle of the [eighteenth] 
century judges more commonly prevented its being given at all.” See John H. Langbein, The Origins of 
Adversary Criminal Trial (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 238; Beattie, Crime and the Courts, 
p. 364. In writing of the seventeenth century trial, J. H. Baker suggests that “hearsay evidence was often 
admitted.” See Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, Fourth Edition (London: Butterworths 
LexisNexis, 2002) p. 510. See also Stephen Landsman, “The Rise of the Contentious Spirit: Adversary 
Procedure in Eighteenth Century England,” Cornell Law Review, vol. 75 (1990), pp. 564-572; Frederick 
W. J. Koch, “The Hearsay Rule’s True Raison d’Être: Its Implications for the New Principled Approach to 
Admitting Hearsay Evidence,” Ottawa Law Review, vol. 37, no. 2 (2005/2006), pp. 249-289.
The Fight for Bourgeois Law in Halifax
20 Histoire sociale / Social History
governor and interfering with the governor’s royal prerogative.58 These actions, 
in the words of the memorial, were “glaring stains of Ingratitude and disrespect to 
the Conduct and memory of our said late Worthy Governor.”59
 The justices defended themselves on every count. Cook’s removal and 
imprisonment was necessary: “the Behaviour of the said Cook during the course 
of the said Tryal was abusive, and he was guilty of such Insolence to the Court, 
and used the Justices with such Contempt that it was impossible to proceed on 
the tryal whilst he was present.” In any case, Lloyd continued to defend Cook, 
“without once intimating that the Cause would suffer by Mr Cook’s Absence or 
ever moving that it might be postponed.” They continued that, once Cook had 
been found in contempt of court, they had a “right” to “private Consultations in 
order to deliberate and resolve ... in such manner as they Judge consistent with 
Law and the nature of the offence,” and that their decisions were announced in 
court. Further, the justices criticized Lloyd’s “Great Breach of Trust” in revealing 
the content of the discussion. The justices were correct that they could meet in 
camera to determine punishment, but their meeting had amounted to a hearing 
with arguments made by Lloyd at least, and such hearings were usually public.
 The justices replied to the specific criticisms made of Morris and Monk by 
attacking the memorialists. Was it the justices or their accusers, the justices asked, 
who “have been the disturbers of the Peace of this Colony ... have laboured 
to pervert the minds of the people from Obedience to his Government and 
Authority”?60 Their remark may have had rhetorical value, but it did not amount 
to a refutation.
 The eighth article in the memorial continued the specific criticism of Morris, 
accusing him of declaring William Bourn a justice of the quorum before the 
governor had done so.61 A justice of the quorum had to be present for the Inferior 
Court or Quarter Sessions to sit at trial. The justices, with some sarcasm, replied 
that this was an event dreamed up “by their Extreme faithful Clerk to disturbe 
the public peace and cause Difficulties without any real cause.” If the justices 
took it upon themselves to include Bourne in the quorum when his commission 
did not, then the justices could have forced the governor to do something he had 
not intended to do just to maintain the impression of coherent governance. If, as 
they maintained, the most they could have done was include him in the quorum 
prematurely but in compliance with the governor’s wishes, then the matter was 
less serious.62
 In their final article, the memorialists turned their attention to King’s Attorney 
Otis Little. They claimed he was frequently tardy or absent from court, resulting 
in long continuances and “a great loss and hurt to numbers of working people and 
58 NSARM RG 1 vol. 209, pp. 271-272. During Cook’s prosecution, Little apparently argued that Cornwallis 
had no right to grant a commission to Cook in the first place. Morris and Monk allowed the argument.
59 NSARM RG 1 vol. 209, pp. 272-273.
60 Ibid., p. 297.
61 Ibid., p. 273.
62 Ibid., p. 298.
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other Inhabitants.”63 The reply did not attempt to explain Little’s conduct. Instead, 
it criticized the critics, particularly the other lawyers:
[The justices] are not conscious of delaying the Court Voluntarily but that some 
of them from their employment as Justices were often assigned to give attention 
thereto out of Court[.] Others have been sometimes prevented by their private 
avocations[.] And they have shown no distinction between Mr Little and the other 
Attorneys unless in the King’s Causes. That the principal occasion of business being 
delayed has proceeded from too much lenity shown to the Parties who have either 
not been prepared with their Witnesses And other proofs in session or from want of 
Knowledge and Experience in the Law in some of the attorneys who have protracted 
and unnecessarily lengthened out their debates.64
The justices’ defence of Little follows the tone of the rest of their reply: restating 
their dedication and legal knowledge and blaming the memorialists for any 
problems in the administration of justice. The legal arguments presented by the 
inhabitants were weak and often wrong, as the justices pointed out. However, the 
contemptuous tone of the justices probably did nothing to assure the memorialists 
or, more importantly, people watching the affair that the administration of the 
courts was just.
The Council’s Ruling and the Fall-out
The council found completely for the justices, ruling that the inhabitants had not 
proven any of the articles of the memorial. The council declared that Halifax legal 
practice conformed to English law and was free of Massachusetts influences. 
Francis Martin had failed to explain his position to the justices, and so they 
had done as necessary and applied the available law and practice. The justices’ 
explanations for the Brennock case were accepted. The council determined there 
was sufficient ground for Cook’s imprisonment for contempt; the irregularity in 
determining Cook’s punishment and bond for his December contempt was its 
leniency and not the in camera proceeding. The council went so far as to note that 
some legal references made by the inhabitants’ lawyer were “falsly quoted, not 
found, misapplyed or not material.” For the remaining complaints about Morris, 
Monk, and Little, the council either accepted the justices’ defences or asserted that 
no matter of complaint had been clearly established or proven.65
 In its ruling, the council was critical of the colony’s bar as a whole. The council 
asserted that no lawyers had been browbeaten by the bench in the past. They urged 
the judges to “never suffer any Lawyer to insult or trifle with their Authority.” They 
warned the attorneys that any lawyer who abused the judiciary would be treated 
severely in the future.66 The council thus underlined the power and authority of the 
justices over the attorneys in the court room.
63 Ibid., p. 273.
64 Ibid., p. 298.
65 Ibid., n.p. (between pp. 308 and 390), February 19, 20, and 23, 1753; March 1, 1753.
66 NSARM RG 1 vol. 209, pp. 389-392.
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 Following Mauger’s division of the colony’s people in his intervention in the 
Power case, in their ruling the council characterized the inhabitants as coming 
from two groups:
[A]mong the Complainants [are] several gentlemen whose property and extensive 
dealings in this colony may naturally give them very real concern and interest in the 
Conduct of the Court of Law and Justice and from whose good behavior we have 
reason to think have no intentions but what as are upright and no views but from 
the Prosperity of the Settlement and to the Remonstrances from such men our Ears 
will always be open.
The second group of people among the memorialists were
of a very different sort, some whom we can scarcely suppose to have been able to 
have formed the least Judgment of the matter lately Exhibited[,] some who have 
scarce any Connection with this place, and some others who we cannot but think 
would have been more properly Employed in the pursuit of their own occupations 
and we can never suppose that the latter became Concerned through the influence 
of the former we fear it too much occasioned by an inattention to their own affairs, 
a thing so fatally precedent in this Town and which never fails to be the source of 
much publick disturbance, much private calamity.67
The council refrained from identifying which memorialists they classified in each 
group. Nevertheless, the council did affirm that some people in Halifax had (and 
deserved to have) a greater influence than others. The dividing line between the 
two is class. The former were wealthy, industrious, and concerned for the colony: 
the very colonial bourgeois led by Mauger. The latter were the transient or idle 
who were incapable, unconnected to the colony, or of marginal economic power, 
all of whom were far from taking leading roles in the affair. It was appropriate for 
the colony’s bourgeois to be concerned with the practice of justice in the colony; 
for others, such complaints were not acceptable. The thrust of the inhabitants’ 
memorial was the partiality of justice available in Halifax. By dividing the 
memorialists into groups worthy and unworthy, members of the council replicated 
partiality even as they denied its existence. The council did not go so far as to state 
that justice was only for those who deserved it. Nonetheless, those colonists with 
greater status were certainly identified as being more deserving than others.
 Despite the ruling, the ultimate victory of the memorialists became clear as the 
governor with his council addressed the composition of the colony’s bench. First, 
on February 28, before the council issued its final ruling, the governor expanded 
the size of the bench by declaring that all members of council, men named in the 
General Commission, and those appointed to be in charge of the settlements at 
Annapolis Royal, Chignecto, Minas, and Pisiquid were to be deemed to be justices 
of the peace. Then, on March 6, just five days after the final ruling on the affair, 
the governor recommissioned Charles Morris, James Monk, John Duport, Robert 
Ewer, and William Bourne as justices of peace and judges of quorum, underlining 
67 Ibid., p. 390-391.
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his faith in them. At the same time, however, Joseph Scott and Sebastian 
Zouberbuhler were appointed as both justices of the peace and judges of quorum 
while John Crawley, James Creighton, and Joseph Gerrish were appointed justices 
of the peace.68
 Zouberbuhler had signed both memorials, while Crawley was likely brother 
to Edmund Crawley, another signatory of both.69 Gerrish and Zouberbuhler were 
merchants and leading members of the colony’s bourgeois, while Crawley appears 
to have been involved in trade with his signatory brother. Of the new appointees 
Crawley came from England, as, it appears, did Creighton and Scott.70 Gerrish and 
Zouberbhuhler seem to have come via New England.71
 Thus, of the ten justices sitting in Halifax as of March of 1753, three or four 
were merchants and three were either memorialists or closely connected to them. 
Reflecting the claimed division between England and New England, four justices 
were either born in or had lived in New England; four likely came directly from 
England. The memorialists now had more allies or men with similar backgrounds 
on the enlarged bench than before, diluting the influence or importance of Morris 
and Monk. In summary proceedings, plaintiffs could choose to go to a justice 
aligned to them politically. At Quarter Sessions and in the Inferior Court of 
Common Pleas, all the justices who attended comprised the bench. By doubling 
the number of commissioned justices the governor may have deprived the old 
justices of a consistent majority. Morris, Monk, and the other justices of late 1752 
won on the face of the council’s ruling, but their reward was to be joined on the 
bench by men associated with their accusers.
 The individuals involved won and lost too. Within a little more than a year, 
both Monk and Little were forced to defend themselves again. Thomas Power 
was imprisoned for unrelated acts sometime in 1752. While Power was in prison, 
Monk played a role in a scheme to get Power’s wife to sell the family’s property. 
The council found him “very unworthy [of] the character a Magistrate ought 
to support,” although he was allowed to keep his commission. Otis Little was 
accused of demanding £10 from Power’s wife (£5 in advance, with £5 to be paid 
after the trial), presumably to ensure acquittal. On April 3, 1753, the council held 
hearings again and ruled the case was “as fully proved as the nature of the case 
would admit.” Little’s commissions as Advocate General of the Vice Admiralty 
and King’s Attorney were revoked, and he was forbidden to represent litigants 
in the General Court (soon to be the Supreme Court) except in direct appeals 
from the Inferior Court of Common Pleas. In 1754, Little left the colony for the 
West Indies and died soon after. William Nesbitt, signatory of both memorials 
in the Justices’ Affair, replaced Little in his appointments.72 Morris fared better, 
68 Ibid., pp. 392-393.
69 NSARM MG 100, vol. 127, no. 24, E. A. Crawley, “An Early Halifax Naval Family.”
70 Joseph Scott may be the same as John Scutt, appointed to the bench in March 1752. Scutt/Scott did not 
participate in the December 1752 sessions. Akins, for example, assumed Scutt and Scott to be the same; 
see History of Halifax, p. 32.
71 Crawley, ”An Early Halifax Naval Family”; Akins, History of Halifax, p. 160, and Selections from the 
public documents, pp. 729, 737; Gwyn, ”Capitalists, Merchants and Manufacturers,” pp. 192-195.
72 Bumsted, “Little, Otis”; John Doull, “The First Five Attorney-Generals of Nova Scotia,” Collections of 
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continuing as chief surveyor as well as justice, sitting on the governor’s council, 
and in the 1760s being made an associate justice of the supreme court. In the late 
1750s, Morris managed to have Monk removed from the commission of justices 
of the peace and replaced by Morris’s son as assistant surveyor general. Monk 
continued on in the colony, but now practised law privately.73
 On the merchants’ side, Power disappears from the record soon after Little’s 
removal from office. In 1754 a creditor from London and several local creditors 
sued Cook into oblivion, and he disappeared from the colony. Mauger remained 
in the colony until 1760, when he moved to England and eventually took up a 
seat in the House of Commons. His business continued in Halifax, however, and 
his clerk (and fellow memorialist in 1752) Isaac Deschamps eventually became 
a local leader in his own right and was appointed associate judge of the Supreme 
Court in 1770.
 A revealing coda to the affair is found in Governor Charles Lawrence’s 
proclamation of January 11, 1759, aimed at attracting emigrants from New 
England to the recently cleared Acadian lands. At one point the proclamation 
read “The Government of Nova Scotia is constituted like those of the neighboring 
colonies.... The Courts of Justice are also constituted in like manner with those of 
the Massachusetts, Connecticut and other Northern colonies.” Brebner described 
this passage as “distinctly disingenuous inasmuch as Lawrence and Belcher had 
fought hard to keep the government of Nova Scotia unlike that of New England” 
by delaying calling an elected assembly.74 Brebner’s description may be apt. 
However, only six years after the Justices’ Affair, the colony’s governor was 
describing its courts as similar to those of New England. This turn-about was not 
so much a vindication of the memorialists’ claims as it was exemplary of how the 
terms of the complaint were mutable depending on the circumstances. The sources 
of the law were not as important as the effects of the law as enforced.
Conclusion
The merchant-bourgeois had won. By rejecting Governor Cornwallis’s authority 
in legal disputes, Ephraim Cook put pressure on the governor and council to 
establish a regular court system. In the flashpoints of Thomas Power’s trial for 
illegal trading and the Justices’ Affair, Joshua Mauger and the merchant community 
had asserted their interests in the practice and enforcement of law in the colony: 
in both cases the initial rulings did not seem to favour the merchants’ position, 
but the fall-out made their interests and themselves a larger part of the law in 
practice. The disputes described here were about power in the colony, and the 
merchants aggressively established their power as both a group to be considered in 
governing and as players in the government of the colony. They expected several 
things of the law and received them: they wanted regular courts, they wanted the 
the Nova Scotia Historical Society, vol. 46 (1925), pp. 35-36; Lois Kernaghan, “Nesbitt, William,” DCB, 
vol. 4, p. 581.
73 Phyllis R. Blakeley, “Monk, James” and “Morris, Charles,” DCB, vol. IV, John Bartlett Brebner, New 
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government to consider their interests in its policy of law enforcement, and they 
wanted the bench to have merchants or their allies on it. Although the governor 
and council supported the justices in the Justices’ Affair, they did not wish to do 
so at the expense of completely alienating the colonial merchant elite; after all, “to 
the Remonstrances from such men our Ears will always be open.”
 Mauger wanted a law that understood the needs of merchants and respected 
those needs. Cook may not have been as articulate in his needs, but he too 
resisted the imposition of legal authority that he did not recognize. Power was to 
Mauger, and probably to others, just one more victim of the zealous anti-business 
government. However, if the colonial state continued to make victims of people 
like Power or Cook, Mauger contended, the entire colony would fail. Its future, 
to his mind, lay in its merchant bourgeois. In these struggles Mauger and the 
other bourgeois essentially demanded a bourgeois law. Bourgeois law in Halifax 
was a civil law that favoured creditor-plaintiffs (as the merchants often were), 
that limited defendant practices like abatement (which almost disappeared after 
1752), and that made collection against property easy. Such practices were not 
always against the interests of others in the colony: in a community with little 
hard currency, labourers, artisans, farmers, retailers, and tavern-keepers all had to 
extend credit. The merchants were not simply fighting for their supremacy over 
everyone else. They already had that economic power: this struggle was to ensure 
that they would not be hurt by the practice of law in the colony. They won, laying 
the legal foundation of the Maritime merchantocracy.
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